Stephen John Stedman: “Spoiler problems in peace processes,” International Security, Vol. Caplan, Richard- Hoeffler, Anke, “Why peace endures: An analysis of post-conflict stabilization,” European journal of international security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2017): 133-152. Lundgren, Magnus, “Conflict management capabilities of peace-brokering international organizations, 1945-2010: A new dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. Some studies focus on the commitment of signatory and non-signatory groups (Bekoe, 2005) to the real commitment of governments to a previous peace agreement, as is the case in Burundi (Joshi and Quinn, 2016). Kirschner (2014), Kyadd and Walter (2002) argue that mistrust and fear can create a problem of engagement on both sides that Toft has described as “implementation on fire” (Toft, 2009). Sometimes involuntary defections could put an end to the implementation of peace agreements. This tenth edition of the peace processes directory analyses the conflicts in which negotiations for a peace agreement are being conducted, whether these negotiations are formalized, whether they are in an exploratory phase, whether they are going well or, on the contrary, whether they are bogged down or in the midst of a crisis. It also analyzes some instances where negotiation or exploration is partial; that is, they do not include all armed groups in the country (for example.
B in the case of India). Most of the negotiations focus on armed conflicts, but we also analyze a range of contexts in which, despite the absence of significant armed conflicts today, the parties have reached a lasting agreement that would put an end to the hostilities and conflicts in unresolved. In this sense, negotiations are useful in preventing the start or resurgence of further armed clashes. There is also another line of scientific study that studies the impact of ideological fluctuations on the implementation of peace agreements. According to Wolford (2007), new governments tend to be rather reluctant to implement the agreements of their predecessors, especially when the ideological orientation of a sitting statesman differs from that of the previous regime. Danzell (2011) said that right-wing governments are restricting democratic space and pushing left-wing and marginalized political parties into conflict. Similarly, Clare (2014) finds that supporters of left-wing parties are more draconian and willing to punish leaders who have a belligerent attitude, while a right-wing electoral base rewards aggressive politics. This manual contains guidelines on the mediation and negotiation aspects of the GDR and provides mediators with ways to establish appropriate links between the GDR and other aspects of a peace process. The manual provides an overview of how the GDR is understood by armed groups and strategies (or counter-measures) that they could adopt to delay, avoid or manipulate the GDR program for political, economic or security gains.
In addition, eight steps are defined, which mediators can undertake to resolve GDR issues. The first four stages are broadly in line with the preliminary phase of negotiations, the next three stages of the negotiation phase and the last of the implementation phase. The aim of this document is to examine the elements of a ceasefire agreement that would be used to facilitate the implementation and sustainability of such agreements. This document was originally presented to the IGAD Sudan Peace Process Workshop on detailed security measures in Sudan during the transition. Since then, it has been discussed in Nepal, Sri Lanka and South Africa. This document offers an introduction to decentralisation and a special territorial autonomy for mediators. It represents the potential for conflict resolution and the risks of these options.